

STATE OF MICHIGAN  
BEFORE THE JUDICIAL TENURE COMMISSION

**COMPLAINT AGAINST:**

**HON. STEVEN R. SERVAAS**

**63<sup>rd</sup> District Court  
105 Maple St.  
Rockford, MI 49341**

**Formal Complaint No. 84**

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**DECISION AND RECOMMENDATION  
FOR ORDER OF DISCIPLINE**

At a session of the Michigan Judicial  
Tenure Commission held on October  
17, 2008, in the City of Detroit

**PRESENT:**

Hon. Barry M. Grant, Chairperson  
Hon. Kathleen J. McCann, Vice Chairperson  
Thomas J. Ryan, Esq., Secretary  
Hon. Jeanne Stempien  
Hon. Michael J. Talbot  
Nancy J. Diehl, Esq.  
Ronald F. Rose  
Hon. Nanci J. Grant  
Marja M. Winters

**I. Introduction**

The Judicial Tenure Commission of the State of Michigan (“Commission”) files this recommendation for discipline against Hon. Steven R. Servaas (“Respondent”), who at all material times was acting as a judge elected to the 63<sup>rd</sup>

District Court, Division 1. This action is taken pursuant to the authority of the Commission under Article 6, § 30 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, as amended, and MCR 9.203.

On May 12, 2008, the Commission received findings of fact and conclusions of law from the Master appointed by the Supreme Court to hear evidence in this matter. Having reviewed the transcript of the hearing, the report, the exhibits, and having considered the oral arguments of counsel, the Commission adopts the findings of facts set forth in the Master's report, with one exception. The Commission concludes, as did the Master, that Respondent vacated his judicial office by removing his domicile beyond the geographic limits of the territory from which he was elected (Count I). Contrary to the Master's finding that Respondent moved to his domicile beyond the geographic limits of the territory from which he was elected in August 2005, the Commission finds that Respondent moved beyond the geographic limits of the territory from which he was elected as early as 2000, before his re-election to his judicial position in 2002.

The Commission agrees with and adopts the Master's conclusion that Respondent's sexually inappropriate doodles and communication demeaned his female staff (Count III). In addition to the Master's findings, the Commission finds that Respondent lied under oath on multiple occasions before and during these proceedings in an effort to conceal his misconduct and the circumstances

regarding the location of his residence beyond the geographic limits of the territory from which he was elected. Finally, the Commission agrees with and adopts the Master's conclusions that the Examiner failed to establish misconduct with respect to the allegation contained in Count II.

Based on these findings, the Commission recommends that the Supreme Court formally remove Respondent from the office of judge of the 63<sup>rd</sup> District Court, Division 1 and order Respondent to pay costs, fees, and expenses in the amount of \$8,364.38 pursuant to MCR 9.205(B), based on its finding that Respondent engaged in intentional misrepresentation and made misleading statements during these proceedings.

## **II. Procedural Background**

On February 14, 2008 the Commission filed Formal Complaint No. 84 asserting three counts against Respondent. Count I alleged that Respondent vacated his judicial office by failing to reside within the election division of his district. Count II alleged that Respondent failed to comply with statutory notice requirements regarding his change of address. Count III alleged that Respondent made sexually inappropriate comments and engaged in sexually inappropriate conduct in the presence of female court staff.

The Respondent filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses on February 27, 2008. The Supreme Court appointed the Honorable Casper O. Grathwohl to take

proofs regarding the allegations contained in Formal Complaint No. 84. The hearing before the Master commenced on March 28, 2008, and continued over four days. On May 12, 2008, the Master issued a report in which he found that two of the three counts of misconduct alleged in the Formal Complaint (Counts I and III) were established by a preponderance of the evidence. The Master found no misconduct on Count II.

On June 12, 2008, Respondent filed written objections to the Master's report and a brief in support of the objections. On June 27, 2008, the Examiner filed a brief in support of the Master's decision. The Commission heard oral argument on Respondent's objections on July 14, 2008.

### **III. Standard Of Proof**

The standard of proof applicable in judicial disciplinary matters is the preponderance of the evidence standard. *In re Ferrara*, 458 Mich 350, 360; 582 NW2d 817 (1998). The Examiner bears the burden of proving set forth in the Complaint. MCR 9.211(A). The Commission reviews the Master's findings de novo. *In re Chrzanowski*, 465 Mich 468, 480-481; 636 NW2d 758 (2001). Although the Commission is not required to accept to the Master's findings of fact, it may appropriately recognize and defer to the Master's superior ability to observe the witnesses' demeanor and comment on their credibility. Cf. *In re Lloyd*, 424 Mich 514, 535; 384 NW2d 9 (1986).

#### **IV. Findings Of Fact**

As noted, the Commission adopts and incorporates by reference the Master's findings of fact. In addition to the findings of fact set forth in the Master's report, the Commission makes these further findings of fact based on its own review of the record:

Respondent admits that his principal residence was beyond the geographic limits of the 63<sup>rd</sup> District - Division 1 for a period between late Summer 2005 until February 22, 2008. At the hearing before the Master, Respondent explained that it was his belief that he could live within the 63<sup>rd</sup> District, but outside of Division 1, during periods when he was not "running for re-election" in Division 1.

We find that Respondent moved his principal residence beyond the geographic limits of the 63<sup>rd</sup> District - Division 1 as early as 2000, before his re-election to his judicial position in 2002.<sup>1</sup>

Respondent testified that he purchased a parcel of property located at 201 Honey Creek Ave., in Ada Township within the boundaries of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division of the 63<sup>rd</sup> District Court in 1998 but did not make that address his principal residence until August or September 2005. In 2006, for tax purposes, Respondent submitted a Homeowner's Principal Residence Exemption Affidavit stating that his principal residence was at the Honey Creek address. Respondent withdrew this affidavit in

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<sup>1</sup> For ease of reference, the evidence regarding Respondent's residency is set forth on the chart attached to the end of this Decision and Recommendation.

February 2008, when he moved to an apartment within the 1<sup>st</sup> Division of the 63<sup>rd</sup> District Court.

At the hearing before the Master, Respondent denied that the Honey Creek address was his principal residence before August or September of 2005. Respondent testified instead that lived at his sister's house (260 Oak St.) within the 1<sup>st</sup> District from 2000-2002, that he moved to a rental property within the 1<sup>st</sup> District (4049 Thirteen Mile Road) from 2002-2004, and that he resided at a condominium within the 1<sup>st</sup> District (8631 Belding Road) from 2004-2005, before moving to the Honey Creek address.

On his 2000 Driver License Application, filed in March 2000, Respondent listed his address as 105 Maple Street, Rockford, which is the address of the courthouse. In August 2000, Respondent changed his driver's license information to indicate a home residence at 260 Oak St., but kept the courthouse address as his mailing address. In March 2002, Respondent changed his driver's license information to indicate a home residence at 4049 Thirteen Mile Road, but again kept the courthouse address as his mailing address. In his March 2004 Driver's License Application, Respondent listed his home address as 8631 Belding Road, but again kept the courthouse address as his mailing address. Although Respondent now admits to living at the Honey Creek address in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division

from 2005 through 2008, Respondent never notified the Secretary of State about the change in his residential address to Honey Creek Ave.

In 2004, Respondent's voter registration application listed 8631 Belding Road as his residence and the courthouse address as his mailing list. As with his driver's license information, Respondent never changed his voter registration to reflect his move to the Honey Creek address, even though he admits that he "knew" he "had to" do so. In 2007, while Respondent was living at the Honey Creek address but still registered to vote at the Belding Road address, Respondent testified that he voted in an election at the precinct for the Belding Road address, but explained that he did not think it was wrong because the election addressed a county-wide millage question.

In 2006, during which time Respondent now admits that he lived at the Honey Creek address in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division, Respondent applied for a safety inspection certificate for a pistol. The address listed on the inspection certificate was 104 S. Monroe, Rockford, which was the address to a house within the 1<sup>st</sup> Division that Respondent sold in 1999. In 2007, during which time Respondent now admits that he lived at the Honey Creek address in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division, Respondent renewed his Concealed Pistol License Application. In the application, which Respondent swore under oath was true and correct to the best of his knowledge, Respondent listed his "Residential Address" as 8631 Belding Road,

the address for the condominium in the 1<sup>st</sup> Division. This sworn statement on Respondent's 2007 Concealed Pistol License Application contradicted the sworn statement in his homestead tax exemption affidavit, effective from 2005 through 2008, that his residence was 201 Honey Creek Ave.

One of Respondent's responsibilities as a judge of the 63<sup>rd</sup> District Court was to be part of the rotation of judges and magistrates available to sign warrants after hours. The judges and magistrates in the rotation were required to submit their current contact information to the court administrator who kept a duty log. The duty log, which was regularly updated, was provided to various police agencies that might have a need to contact a judge or magistrate in the middle of the night. All of the telephone numbers included on the duty log were provided by the judges and magistrates themselves. The duty log established that Respondent provided as his contact telephone number to the land line at the Honey Creek address for most of the period of 2000 through 2007.

From January 2000 until June 2004, during which time Respondent testified that he resided at his sister's house and then later a rental home within the 1<sup>st</sup> Division, the telephone number Respondent provided for the duty log was his land line at the Honey Creek address. For all of 2005, when Respondent testified that he resided at the Belding Road address, the telephone number Respondent provided for the duty log was his line at the Belding Road address, but these calls



were forwarded to his land line at the Honey Creek address. For the period from January through June 2006, the duty log again listed Respondent's contact information as a land line at the Honey Creek address.

From July 2006 through December 2006, Respondent switched his contact information back to the Belding Road number, but again had these calls forwarded to the Honey Creek address. The court administrator, who was responsible for updating the duty log, testified that Respondent told her to change the contact information back to the Belding Road address for July 2006 through December 2006 because "he'd had a visit from the State Court Administrative Office and they questioned his residency." Respondent also told the court administrator that he would be moving back into the Belding Road address, but that the calls would be forwarded to Honey Creek and ring at both locations. In fact, Respondent never moved back to the Belding Road address. This situation remained in place until December 2006, when Respondent temporarily went off of the duty log. Finally, in September 2007, Respondent provided the Honey Creek number as his contact information.

Considering all of these facts, which are not disputed, we find that Respondent maintained his primary residence at the Honey Creek address, in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division, for the entire time period between January 2000 through February 22, 2008. The period from August or September 2005 through February 22, 2008 is

not disputed. Consistent with his homestead exemption affidavit, Respondent admits that he resided at the Honey Creek address during this time. For the three and a half years from January 2000 through June 2004 when Respondent was a part of the duty log rotation, his contact information—listing the place where he could be reach in the middle of the night—was his telephone line at the Honey Creek address. The only time when Responded listed a different number was for 2005 and again during part of 2006 when his contact information was listed at the Belding Road address, but these calls were still being forwarded to the Honey Creek address.

While admittedly residing at the Honey Creek address in 2007, Respondent falsely swore on his Concealed Pistol License Application that he resided at the Belding Road address and improperly voted in an election from the Belding Road precinct, demonstrating an effort by Respondent to maintain the formal appearance of a residence within 1<sup>st</sup> Division despite having an actual residence in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division. These facts also undermine any conclusion regarding Respondent's residence that might otherwise be drawn from the various other 1<sup>st</sup> District residences listed on Respondent's driver's license applications from 2000 through 2005.

Given our finding that Respondent maintained his residence at the Honey Creek address from January 2000 through February 22, 2008, we find that

Respondent provided false testimony to the Master when he testified to having different principal residences, within the 1<sup>st</sup> Division, from the time period of January 2000 through August 2005.

Respondent also provided false testimony to the Master when he testified that he had no knowledge of ever making a doodle of a woman's breasts on a note in court. Respondent's testimony to the Master directly contradicted his answer to the Examiner's complaint, in which he admitted he made a breast doodle as a private joke. Additionally, contrary to the testimony of the court clerk, Respondent denied ever saying he was surprised by a female staff member's negative reaction to a comment about her chest size because "I say stuff like that to you guys all the time." The Master, who had an opportunity to observe the testimony of both the clerk and the Respondent, concluded that Respondent was "less than truthful when he denied saying anything like that on cross examination." We adopt the Master's finding with respect to Respondent's truthfulness.

## **V. Conclusions Of Law**

### **A. Interpretation and Application of Const. 1963, art. 6. § 30**

Const. 1963, art. 6. § 30 provides that "[w]henever a justice or judge removes his domicile beyond the limits of the territory from which he was elected or appointed, he shall have vacated his office." The primary objective of constitutional interpretation is to give meaning to the intent of those who enacted

the law, which may be discerned from “the common understanding of constitutional text by applying each term’s plain meaning at the time of ratification.” *Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc v Governor of Mich*, 481 Mich 56, 67-68; 748 NW2d (2008).

The Master interpreted the word “domicile” to mean the same thing as the word “residence,” which means the single place of permanence where one returns and intends to remain. See *In re Scheyer’s Estate*, 336 Mich 645, 651-652; 59 NW2d 33 (1953). Neither Respondent nor the Examiner take issue with this interpretation. They agree that Respondent established a domicile in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division when he moved to the Honey Creek address. As discussed above, the only *factual* question regarding the move was its timing.

The *legal* quarrel between Respondent and the Examiner in this case is over the meaning of the phrase “the territory from which he was elected or appointed” within Const. 1963, art. 6. § 30. The Master concluded that, as applied to this case, the phrase refers only to the 1<sup>st</sup> District of the 63<sup>rd</sup> District. The Examiner agrees. Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the phrase applies to the entire 63<sup>rd</sup> District.<sup>2</sup> We agree with the Master and the Examiner.

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<sup>2</sup> The sincerity of Respondent’s proposed broad interpretation of the provision is called into question by his explanation at the hearing that he believed he had to be domiciled within the 1<sup>st</sup> Division during times when he was “running” for re-election.

The word “territory” is generally understood to mean a defined geographic area. The parties do not dispute this elementary conclusion. In this case, there are two potentially relevant “territories.” The “territory” emphasized by the Examiner is the 1<sup>st</sup> District of the 63<sup>rd</sup> District. The “territory” emphasized by Respondent is the entire 63<sup>rd</sup> District. As between these two territories, we conclude that the divisional territory emphasized by the Examiner is the relevant territory. We reach this conclusion by considering the plain meaning of the second half of the phrase in question—the words, “from which he was elected.” It is undisputed that only residents within the geographic boundaries of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division may vote for the judges of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division and only residents within the geographic boundaries of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division may vote for the judges of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division. Accordingly, Respondent was only elected by the residents of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division of the 63<sup>rd</sup> District Court. Therefore, contrary to Respondent’s argument, the phrase “the territory from which he was elected or appointed” must be interpreted to mean the geographic area comprising only the 1<sup>st</sup> Division of the 63<sup>rd</sup> District Court.

It is undisputed that Respondent’s domicile was outside the geographic area of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division of the 63<sup>rd</sup> District Court from August 2005 through February 22, 2008. As noted above, we find that Respondent’s domicile was outside the geographic area of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division of the 63<sup>rd</sup> District Court from at least January of 2000.

Under the plain meaning of Const. 1963, art. 6. § 30, once Respondent removed his domicile beyond the limits of the territory from which he was elected, he “vacated his office” as a judge of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division of the 63<sup>rd</sup> District Court. Thus, while Respondent has been acting as a judge of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division of the 63<sup>rd</sup> District Court, he has lacked the legal authority to do so since January 2000, when he vacated the office by moving outside the limits of the territory of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division of the 63<sup>rd</sup> District Court. Once a person has vacated judicial office, he or she may not simply re-enter judicial office by moving their permanent residence back into the appropriate geographic territory. One may become a judge only by proper election or appointment.

B. The Legal Basis for the Imposition of Discipline

We adopt and incorporate the conclusions of law set forth in the Master’s report. The facts asserted in the Formal Complaint and established at the public hearing in this matter show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent breached the standards of judicial conduct and is responsible for all of the following:

- Vacating his judicial office (Count I only);
- Failing to comply with the constitutional and statutory residency requirements to hold a judicial seat (Count I only);
- Misconduct in office as defined by the Michigan Constitution of 1963, as amended Article VI, § 30 and MCR 9.205;

- Conduct clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice, as defined by the Michigan Constitution of 1963, as amended Article VI, § 30 and MCR 9.205 (Count I only);
- Failure to establish, maintain, enforce and personally observe high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved, contrary to the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct (MCJC), Canon 1;
- Conduct involving impropriety or the appearance of impropriety, which erodes public confidence in the judiciary, in violation of MCJC, Canon 2A;
- Failure to respect and observe the law and so conduct himself at all times in a manner which would enhance the public's confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary contrary to MCJC, Canon 2B;
- Failure to treat every person with courtesy and respect without regard to gender, contrary to MCJC, Canon 2B (Count III only);
- Failure to be patient, dignified, and courteous to those with whom you deal in an official capacity, contrary to MCJC, Canon 3A(3) (Count III only);
- Conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice, in violation of MCR 9.104(A)(1);
- Conduct that exposes the legal profession or courts to obloquy, contempt, censure or reproach, contrary to MCR 9.104(A)(2);
- Conduct contrary to justice, ethics, honesty or good morals, in violation of MCR 9.104(A)(3);
- Conduct that violates the standard or rules of professional responsibility adopted by the Supreme Court, contrary to MCR 9.104(A)(4);
- Conduct violating the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 *et seq.* (Count III only).

## VI. Disciplinary Analysis

### A. The *Brown* Factors

The Michigan Supreme Court set forth the criteria for assessing proposed sanctions in *In re Brown*, 461 Mich 1291, 1292-1293; 625 NW2d 744 (1999). A discussion of the relevant factors follows.

(1) ***Misconduct that is part of a pattern or practice is more serious than an isolated instance of misconduct.***

Respondent's conduct was part of long pattern of deceit. From as early as 2000, Respondent was living at the Honey Creek address, beyond the geographic limits of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division of the 63<sup>rd</sup> District Court, while creating the appearance and availing himself of the illusion that he was properly residing within the 1<sup>st</sup> Division of the 63<sup>rd</sup> District Court. Accordingly, this factor weighs heavily in favor of the imposition of a severe sanction.

(2) ***Misconduct on the bench is usually more serious than the same misconduct off the bench.***

The conduct occurred off the bench.

(3) ***Misconduct that is prejudicial to the actual administration of justice is more serious than misconduct that is prejudicial only to the appearance of propriety.***

Because Respondent vacated his judicial office in 2000, and has been acting without proper legal authority for almost a decade, his conduct has had a severe negative effect on the administration of justice. Respondent has put at risk every



action he purported to take under color of law. This factor weighs heavily in favor of the imposition of a severe sanction.

- (4) *Misconduct that does not implicate the actual administration of justice, or its appearance of impropriety, is less serious than misconduct that does.*

Respondent's actions involved misconduct that implicated the actual administration of justice and created an appearance of impropriety. This factor would weigh in favor of a more severe sanction if we had not already concluded, in our analysis of factor (3), that Respondent's actions actually prejudiced the actual administration of justice. Under the circumstances of this case, this factor is duplicative.

- (5) *Misconduct that occurs spontaneously is less serious than misconduct that is premeditated or deliberated.*

Respondent's actions reveal a conscious attempt to avoid detection. Accordingly, his factor weighs heavily in favor of the imposition of a severe sanction.

- (6) *Misconduct that undermines the ability of the justice system to discover the truth of what occurred in a legal controversy, or to reach the most just result in such a case, is more serious than misconduct that merely delays such discovery.*

A just result cannot be reached without a judge having proper authority. Accordingly, this factor weighs heavily in favor of the imposition of a severe sanction.

- (7) *Misconduct that involves the unequal application of justice on the basis of such considerations as race, color, ethnic background, gender, or religion are more serious than breaches of justice that do not disparage the integrity of the system on the basis of a class of citizenship.*

This factor is not at issue in this case.

Our consideration of the totality of all seven *Brown* factors weighs heavily in support of the imposition of a severe sanction.

B. The Basis for the Level of Discipline and Proportionality

In determining an appropriate sanction in this matter, the Commission is mindful of the Michigan Supreme Court's call for "proportionality" based on comparable conduct. Based on the facts, we believe that removal from office is an appropriate and proportional sanction for Respondent's misconduct. In this case, removal from office is a necessary sanction considering the fact that Respondent himself has admittedly vacated his seat by moving his domicile outside the limits of the territory of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division of the 63<sup>rd</sup> District Court.

While our conclusion is based on the totality of the circumstances, we are primarily motivated by the conduct alleged in Count I of the Complaint and by Respondent's lack of candor and honesty with the Master and the Commission.<sup>3</sup> Apart from Respondent's deliberate attempt to avoid detection while living outside the territory from which he was elected, Respondent's false testimony to the

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<sup>3</sup> Standing alone, the sexually inappropriate conduct alleged in Count III would merit a public censure.

Master about his domicile for the years 2000 through 2005, his false testimony to the Master about lacking knowledge of the breast doodle, and his false denial of making statements to the court clerk about the staff member's reaction to his chest-size comments render Respondent unfit to sit as a judge. This conclusion is compounded by the fact that Respondent has submitted conflicting sworn affidavits to the State of Michigan regarding the location of his residence during 2007.

In the case of *In re Ferrara*, 458 Mich 350, 365-369; 582 NW2d 817 (1998), the Supreme Court removed Judge Andrea J. Ferrara from office in large part because she twice attempted to submit evidence to the Commission under false pretenses. In accepting the Commission's recommendation for removal, the Supreme Court opined that "deception of this sort is 'antithetical to the role of a judge who is sworn to uphold the law and seek the truth.'" *Ferrara, supra*, at 369, quoting *In re Collazo*, 91 NY2d 251, 255; 691 NE2d 1021, 688 NYS2d 997 (1998), quoting *Matter of Myers*, 67 NY2d 550, 554; 496 NE2d 207; 505 NYS2d 48 (1986). Likewise, the Court removed Judge James P. Noecker because he attempted to deceive the police and the Commission in order to cover up the fact that he had been driving under the influence of alcohol. *In re Noecker, supra*. Respondent's dishonest conduct here merits the same response.

For these reasons, the Commission concludes that removal from office is an appropriate and proportional level of discipline. Respondent is unfit for judicial office.


### **VIII. Assessment of Costs, Fees, and Expenses**

The Commission finds that Respondent engaged in deceit and intentional misrepresentation. Most specifically, Respondent presented false testimony to the Master. Accordingly, we request that Respondent be ordered to pay the costs, fees, and expenses incurred by the Commission in prosecuting the complaint. See MCR 9.205(B). The Examiner has submitted a bill showing costs, fees, and expenses incurred by the Commission in the amount of \$8,364.38.

### **IX. Conclusion and Recommendation**

The Commission concludes that Respondent committed judicial misconduct. Based on the nature and pervasiveness of the misconduct, the Commission recommends that Respondent be removed from office, and that Respondent be ordered to pay an assessment of costs, fees, and expenses in the total amount of \$8,364.38.

JUDICIAL TENURE COMMISSION



HON. BARRY M. GRANT

Chairperson



HON. KATHLEEN J. McCANN  
Vice-Chairperson



THOMAS J. RYAN, ESQ.  
Secretary




HON. JEANNE STEMPIEN



HON. MICHAEL J. TALBOT




NANCY J. DIEHL, ESQ.



RONALD F. ROSE



HON. Nanci J. GRANT



MARA M. WINTERS

Year	Respondent's Testimony	Other Evidence	Duty Log Phone Listing
1998	S. Monroe St. (Div. 1)	Purchased Honey Creek property.	None
1999	S. Monroe St. (Div. 1) through June.  Oak St. (Div. 1), as tenant in sister's house, after June.	Sold S. Monroe St. Property	None
2000	Oak St. (Div. 1)	Driver's License Application listing 105 Maple St. (courthouse) as address.  In August 2000, changed "home" address on Driver's License to Oak St., but kept courthouse as mailing address.	Honey Creek.
2001	Oak St. (Div. 1)		Honey Creek.
2002	Oak St. (Div. 1)  In "early" 2002, moved to 13 Mile Rd. (Div. 1), as tenant.	In March 2002, changed "home" address on Driver's License to 13 Mile Rd., but kept courthouse as mailing address.	Honey Creek.
2003	13 Mile Rd. (Div. 1)		Honey Creek.
2004	13 Mile Rd. (Div. 1)  In "early" 2004, moved to condominium on Belding Rd. (Div. 1).	On March 11, 2004, registered to vote at Belding Rd. address.  On March 23, 2004, changed "home" address on Driver's License to Belding Rd., but kept courthouse as mailing address.	Honey Creek, through June 2004. No listing after June.
2005	Belding Rd. (Div. 1)  Moved to Honey Creek (Div. 2), as of August or September	Did not change driver's license information or voter registration to Honey Creek address.	Belding Rd., with calls forwarded to Honey Creek.

Year	Respondent's Testimony	Other Evidence	Duty Log Phone Listing
2006	Honey Creek (Div. 2)	<p>Filed "Homeowner's Principal Residence Affidavit" listing Honey Creek address as principal residence for tax purposes.</p> <p>Applied for safety inspection certificate for pistol, listing S. Monroe St. as address.</p>	<p>Honey Creek, through June.</p> <p>Belding Rd., with calls forwarded to Honey Creek, from July through December.</p>
2007	Honey Creek (Div. 2)	<p>Voted in county-wide election from Belding Rd. address.</p> <p>Renewed Concealed Pistol License application listing Belding Rd. as residence.</p>	Honey Creek
2008	<p>Honey Creek (Div. 2), through February 21, 2008.</p> <p>Shaner Ave. (Div 1), as of February 22, 2008.</p>	<p>Withdrew Homeowner's Affidavit listing Honey Creek as principal residence.</p> <p>Registered to vote at Shaner Ave., after February 22, 2008.</p>	